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Abstract—To facilitate more efficient control, massive amounts
of sensors or measurement devices will be deployed in the Smart
Grid. Data collection then becomes non-trivial. In this paper,
we study the scenario where a data collector is responsible for
collecting data from multiple measurement devices, but only some
of them can communicate with the data collector directly. Others
have to rely on other devices to relay the data. We first develop a
communication protocol so that the data reported by each device
is protected again honest-but-curious data collector and devices.
To reduce the time to collect data from all devices within a certain
security level, we formulate our approach as an integer linear
programming problem. As the problem is NP-hard, obtaining
the optimal solution in a large network is not very feasible. We
thus develop an approximation algorithm to solve the problem.
We test the performance of our algorithm using real topologies.
The results show that our algorithm successfully identifies good
solutions within reasonable amount of time.
I. INTRODUCTION
One of the significant hallmarks of the Smart Grid (SG)
initiative is the pervasive data sensing to facilitate a more
efficient control. While the existing Supervisory Control And
Data Acquisition (SCADA) system already collects data from
various sensors, the scale and scope of the data collection
in the SG are expected to pose new challenges. Applications
of data sensing in the SG include conditional and structural
monitoring of Distributed Energy Resources and renewables in
the generation; State-of-Charge monitoring; substation, trans-
former, underground and overhead lines in the transmission
and distribution; and collection of information from smart
meters in the Advanced Metering Infrastructure (AMI) [1].
In addition to the emerging and new sensing in the SG, data
collection from the legacy telemetric devices widely deployed
in the field needs to be accommodated as part of the infrastruc-
ture, at the very least, in the transitional period. An example
of such legacy telemetric collection need is provided in [2].
In this scenario, a mobile data collector (DC) moves along
a road, or a certain path, to collect data from measurement
devices (MDs). It can only connect directly to the MDs that
are within DC’s proximity. We call the MDs that can talk to
the DC directly root MDs. Those MDs that are outside the
communication range of the DC have to send data to the DC
through root MDs in a multihop manner. Figure 1 presents a
simple example where only root MDs (MD1, MD2, MD3) can
talk to the DC directly. Other remote MDs should send their
data to one of the root MDs. Note that the underlying data
collection paradigm of the aforementioned case is present in
many other emerging sensing and measurement scenarios [1],
[3], especially when sequential data collection is needed over
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Fig. 2. Disjoint Trees.
a multihop communications topology. To reduce the number
of messages needed for the whole data collection, we propose
generating several disjoint trees, each rooted at a certain MD,
such that the trees reach all MDs. Fig. 2 shows an example,
where bold edges show the trees formed from the roots.
In this paper, we are interested in secure, scalable, and
optimized data collection in the SG. Our objective is to reduce
the total data collection time while ensuring the confidentiality
of the data. We encrypt data in a way that while allowing
the relaying MDs to verify the message integrity, they cannot
read the content under the honest-but-curious model. The data
collection time is reduced through identifying data collection
trees that have minimum sum of depths. We develop an
optimization problem for the secure data collection, which is
NP-Hard, and then develop an approximation algorithm.
The rest is organized as follows: Sec. II presents the
related work. Tree-based secure data collection is detailed
in Sec. III. Sec. IV develops the optimization problem and
solution together with an approximation algorithm. Simulation
results are given in Sec. V. Sec. VI concludes the paper.
II. RELATED WORK
To the best of our knowledge, confidential data collection
with integrity validation by means of forming disjoint trees
to minimize the total collection time has not been studied in
the literature. We dissect our problem into three constituents
in order to present a discussion of the partially related work:
(1) Multi-sink data collection in Wireless Sensor Networks
(WSNs) and opportunistic networks [4], (2) Tree or cluster
formation, and (3) Secure data collection.
There is some similarity in our formulation to data collec-
tion via mobile relay nodes [5], except that the objective of
our approach is not energy efficiency Data collection by means
of mobile sinks [6] is somewhat related in the sense that we
are looking to choose the root of trees to relay the data to.
The optimization part of our problem is similar to the Base
Station Problem from [7] where the problem of positioning
data collecting nodes in a WSN is studied as a maximum
flow problem with the objective of finding the optimal data
rate. The NP-completeness proof of the problem is also
given in [7]. While retaining the complexity1, our problem
is about the minimization of total time of the data collection
and incorporates the security aspect. The tree formation of
our approach connotes clustering algorithms, especially in
WSNs [9]. However, unlike the goals of WSN clustering on
node reachability and network longevity, we focus on security
and data collection time minimization.
Finally, as for the security of the data collection task, there
are two major approaches: One is to ensure the protection of
the data content directly without regard to the data seman-
tics. An approach presented in [10] is based on symmetric
cryptography to provide data confidentiality and authentica-
tion between sensors and the base station. [11] describes
a protocol for DC to collect data from an MD, but direct
communication between DC and MD is assumed. Another
category for providing security exploits the aggregate statistics
of the sensed data, such as summation, average, minimum,
maximum, etc. These approaches take advantage of in-network
data processing (also referred to as aggregation) to induce
some obfuscating operations on the transmitted data [12]–
[20]. Our problem formulation does not assume any statistical
property for in-network processing.
III. SECURE DATA COLLECTION VIA TREES
A. Overview
A Power Operator (PO) delegates a DC to collect data
from a certain number of MDs. We assume each entity in
the system possesses a pair of public and private key as long-
term secrets. We denote the public key and private key of node
A as A+ and A−, respectively. Before an MD is installed in
the field, it is configured with its own public/private key pair
and the public key of PO, but not the public key of DC. Our
architecture does not require an MD to know the public keys
of its neighbors, either. Apart from the keys, all entities are
also configured with Diffie-Hellman (DH) parameters g and p
for shared key establishment2. PO, DC, and MDs all agree to
use the following basic cryptographic functions.
1) PKE(K,M) : Public key encryption on message M using
key K
2) SKE(K,M) : Symmetric key encryption on M using K
3) SIG(A,M) : Signature of M by A (created using A−)
4) HASH(K,M) : Compute the keyed-hash of M using key K
The security objective of the data collection is to protect the
data reported by each MD such that only the PO can read the
data generated by MDs. That is, even though the data reported
has to be relayed by other MDs and the DC, these MDs and
1Complexity of the optimization part of our problem may also be obtained
from the classical multi-facility location problem [8].
2p is a prime number, and g is a primitive root mod p. Let A pick a secret
a and B pick a secret b. A sends gamod p to B, and B sends gbmod p to A.
A can then compute the shared key by (gbmod p)amod p. B computes the
key by (gamod p)bmod p.
DC should not be able to read it. To achieve this efficiently,
data should be encrypted by a shared key between a certain
MD and the PO using symmetric key cryptography. We adopt
the DH mechanism to develop the shared keys. On the other
hand, to allow intermediate MDs to perform integrity checks,
all the MDs within the same disjoint tree share a Group Key
GK (to be explained below) with PO and DC.
We now briefly describe the whole procedure of data
collection. First, the PO determines the disjoint trees to be
used for data collection. Then, it provides the tree information
and the necessary key information to the DC. The DC then
talks to each root MD along its path to collect data. Root MD
sends the key information along each branch on its tree to
collect data. After it receives data from all MDs in its tree, it
sends the data to DC.
B. Data Collection on a Branch
We first describe a simple situation that data is collected
along a certain branch on the tree. We then describe the data
collection of a whole tree. Fig. 3 presents how DC collects data
on a tree branch spanning from MD1, the root MD, to MD2,
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Fig. 3. Data Collection on a Tree Branch.
and then MD3. Let the branch be MD1 → MD2 → . . .MDl ,
where MD1 is the root MD. The public DH key of PO is g
c
(mod p is dropped for brevity), and the group key is GK. The
key information created by the PO is denoted by C = gc||GK,
where || represents the concatenation operation. Each MD on
the branch must receive C to develop a shared key with the
PO. The detailed procedure of data collection is as follows:
1) DC →MD1: DC
+||SIG(PO,C)||SIG(DC,C)||
[PKE(MD+k ,C),1≤ k ≤ l]
To protect C from eavesdroppers, C is encrypted using the
public keys of the MDs. As only the PO knows the public
keys of all the MDs, PKE(MD+k ,C) for 1 ≤ k ≤ l are
created by PO and sent to DC, which will be discussed in
Section III-C. MD1 authenticates C by verifying the signature
SIG(PO,C). MD1 verifies the legitimacy of DC by verifying
SIG(DC,C). MD1 then signs C using its public key and sends
the signature together with other information to the next MD
along the branch.
2) MD1 →MD2: MD
+
1 ||SIG(PO,C)||SIG(MD1,C)||
[PKE(MD+k ,C),2≤ k ≤ l]
Note that as MD1 also sends MD
+
1 to MD2 so that MD2
does not need to know any public key of any MD before the
communication. When MD2 receives the message, it performs
similar operations as MD1 that it authenticates C and MD1. It
then passes the key information to the next MD (more details
will be provided in Section III-C).
3) MDi →MDi+1: MD
+
i ||SIG(PO,C)||SIG(MDi+1,C)||
[PKE(MD+k ,C), i+1≤ k ≤ l]
Intermediate MDs on a tree branch keep forwarding the key
information to the next MD after retrieving GK and gc from
C.
4) MDl−1 →MDl : MD
+
l−1||SIG(PO,C)||SIG(MDl−1,C)||
PKE(MD+l ,C)
MDl is the last MD on the branch. After verifying C, it
prepares the reported data. It first generates its own DH
half key gdl and develops the shared key between itself and
the PO, which is gcdl . Let DATAl be the data encrypted
and integrity protected using gcdl . MDl then sends DATAl
to MDl−1 for relaying to DC and finally to PO. To allow
MDl−1 to perform authentication check on DATAl , MDl
computes the hash of DATAl using g
dl . MDl should also
let MDl−1 and the PO knows what g
dl is. Let message
Mk = SKE(GK,g
dk)||SIG(MDk,g
dk)||DATAk for 1 ≤ k ≤ l.
Ml contains the DH half key and the encrypted data to be
delivered to the PO.
5) MDl →MDl−1: MD
+
l ||Ml ||HASH(g
dl ,DATAl)
MDl−1 first retrieves g
dl from SKE(GK,gdl ) contained in
Ml and verifies SIG(MDl ,g
dl ). It then can authenticate the
message by verifying the hash. Note that although MDl−1
knows gc and gdl , according to the property of DH protocol,
MDl−1 still cannot compute g
cdl to decrypt DATAl . Thus,
DATAl remains secret to MDk for all k = 1, . . . , l−1 and the
DC. After verifying the message, MDl−1 prepares its own
encrypted data DATAl−1 and sends both DATAl and DATAl−1
to MDl−2 together with the required key information.
6) MDl−1 →MDl−2:
MD+l−1||Ml−1||Ml ||HASH(g
dl−1 ,DATAl−1||Ml)
MDl−2 processes the message in a similar manner as MDl−1
does. Finally, MD1 would receive a message from MD2 that
contains all the data from MD2 to MDl . It can then prepare a
message that contains all the data on the branch for the DC.
7) MD1 → DC:
MD+1 ||M1||M2|| . . . ||Ml ||HASH(g
d1 ,DATA1||M2|| . . . ||Ml)
C. Tree Structure Representation
To facilitate a root MD to collect data for its tree, it has to
know which neighbors belong to its tree. The root MD also
needs to inform its children of their children. In other words,
the tree structure has to be embedded in the message from the
DC to the root MD, and passed along to the MDs on the tree.
C = gc||GK has to be encrypted using the public key of each
MD on the tree. We use PKE(MD+i ,C) for all MDi on the
tree to represent the tree. Let E(i) = PKE(MDi,C), and let
T (i) be the tree representation rooted at MDi. We further let
MDch1 , . . . , MDchm be the children of MDi if it is not a leaf.
The representation is as follows:
T (i) =
{
[E(i),T (ch1), . . . ,T (chm)] if MDi is not a leaf
E(i) if MDi is a leaf
Refer to the tree rooted at MD2 in Fig. 2, T (2) =
[E(2),E(6), [E(8),E(9)]].
When MDi receives T (i), it can retrieve C from
E(i). It can also identify its children to forward key
information. Let MD j be a child of MDi, it sends
MD+i ||SIG(PO,C)||SIG(MDi,C)||T ( j) to MD j.
An MD should wait for all its children to report
data before sending its data to its parent. Data report-
ing does not have to follow the tree structure. A par-
ent MD can simply append all Mk of descendant MDk
together. For example, MD2 in Fig. 2 can send DC
MD+2 ||M2||M6||M8||M9||HASH(g
d2 ,DATA2||M6||M8||M9).
D. Completing the Protocol
We now complete the protocol by describing the communi-
cation between the PO and the DC. Fig. 4 illustrates the infor-
mation exchange. They first use the DH protocol to establish
PO DC
PKE(DC+, ga||nonce) SIG(PO, ga)
PKE(PO+, gb) SKE(K, nonce)
K = gab mod p
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:
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k
|| SIG(PO, C
k
)) || T(r
k
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C
k
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Contact the head MDs
Fig. 4. Communication between PO and DC.
a shared secret K to secure the subsequent conversation. PO
picks the group keys to be used. The tree structure and the
key information are then encrypted using K. Suppose there
are k root MDs, MDr1 ,MDr2 , . . . ,MDrk . PO can use different
DH half keys and group keys to develop shared keys with the
MDs on different trees. Let the DH half key and the group
key for the tree rooted at MDhi be g
ci and GKi, respectively.
We further let Ci = g
ci ||GKi. For root MD MDhi , PO sends
SKE(K,Ci||SIG(PO,Ci))||T (hi) to DC. DC can then verify
the signature for each Ci and talk to the root MDs to collect
data as described earlier. After all data are collected, DC
encrypts M j for each MD j it collects using K. Note that
M j = SKE(GKi,g
d j)||SIG(MD j,g
d j)||DATA j, which belongs
to the tree of MDi, contains enough information for the PO to
retrieve and verify the data.
E. Security Discussion and Its Complexity
In our protocol, the confidentiality of the data is ensured
through the Diffie-Hellman keys. The DH half keys are trans-
mitted under encryption. Eavesdroppers cannot read them. The
data remains confidential to the honest-but-curious DC and
intermediate MDs as well because, although they can read the
public DH keys exchanged between the PO and the MD, they
cannot establish the DH key themselves. Key information from
the root to the leaves are authenticated through signatures,
while data from the leaves to the root are authenticated through
the hashes in a hop-by-hop manner. Although a tampering on
data can be detected by the PO eventually, by authenticating
the data in a hop-by-hop manner, tampering can be identified
early so that network resources would not have been spent on
transmitting the tampered data from the leaf to the PO. Our
protocol is thus secure from both active and passive attacks
when the keys are not leaked. (We consider the risk of leaking
the group key in our problem formulation in Sec. IV-A).
We now study the computational complexity of an MD. We
only consider public key and DH operations since symmetric
key and hash operations are not expensive. The leaf MD
receives one message from its parent and sends one message
to its parent in each data collection cycle. It has to decrypt
the key information and verify two signatures for the message
received. To prepare the reply, it generates a DH half key and
signs it. Five operations are needed in total for a leaf node.
Similar operations are needed for the messages to and from the
parent for each non-leaf MD. To send messages to its children,
an MD has to sign the key information. For each reply from a
child, it has to verify the signature of the half key provided by
the child. Therefore, the total number of operations a non-leaf
MD needs to perform is 6 + number of children.
IV. COLLECTION TREE FORMATION
A. Problem Description
In this section, we describe how PO constructs the disjoint
data collection trees on the network connectivity graph G of
MDs. Since the PO has complete information of the topology,
graph G, a connected vertex set of all MDs, is known a priori.
We use set M = {1,2, · · ·} to denote the index set of these
MDs. Furthermore, if there is a direct connectivity between
two MDs then an undirected edge exists between them in
graph G. Furthermore, we define the set of all MDs that can
potentially be selected as the root MDs candidate set, and we
useR to denote the set of indices of these candidate root MDs.
The largest possible candidate set consists of all the MDs that
can be physically within the communication range of the DC
when it is traveling along the predefined data collection path.
For example, in Fig. 1, R= {1,2,3}.
Our objective is to minimize the sum of the data collection
time over all trees. We further assume identical link delays.
Then, we can use the depth of a data collection tree to
represent the time needed to collect data from this particular
tree and the summation of the depths over all constructed trees
to represent the overall data collection time.
Apart from the time to collect data, we also consider the
security level of the group key. As the MDs may not be in a
very secure physical environment, there is a risk of leaking the
group key. If the group key is stolen, the attacker can decrypt
SKE(GK,gdk) in Mk to obtain g
dk and create the correct hash
of fake data. Although the PO can finally detect the data were
not legitimate, network resource will be wasted in transmitting
the message. Assume that every MDi (i∈M) leaks the group
key with probability pi. Then the probability that the group
key of a tree T is leaked is Pleak(T ) = 1−∏i:MDi∈T (1− pi).
To ensure the security level of every constructed tree T , we
limit Pleak(T ) to be no larger than some predefined threshold.
We assume identical pi’s. Then, if we limit the group key
leaking probability to be no larger than some threshold value
Pthreshold , we have:
Pleak(T ) = 1− ∏
i:MDi∈T
(1− pi) = 1− (1− p)
|T | ≤ Pthreshold
In other words, the cardinality of every constructed tree
should satisfy
|T | ≤
log(1−Pthreshold)
log(1− p)
= Nthreshold (1)
As detailed in the next subsection, we formulate the opti-
mization problem with a Min−Sum−Max objective to mini-
mize the summation of the depths over all constructed trees
with the aforementioned security constraint.
B. Mathematical Formulation
We state the optimal collection tree formation (CTF) prob-
lem into a binary integer programming formulation as follows:
min ∑
j∈R
(
max
i∈M
∑
k∈Ki j
xki jLi j
)
(2)
s.t. ∑
i∈M
∑
k∈Ki j
xki j ≤ Nthreshold ,∀ j ∈R (3)
∑
j∈R
∑
k∈Ki j
xki j = 1,∀i ∈M (4)
xki j ≤ x
l
m j,∀i ∈M,m ∈Ni,P
l
m j ⊆ P
k
i j (5)
xki j ∈ {0,1},∀i ∈M, j ∈R,k ∈ Ki j (6)
Ni: the set of neighbors of MDi. P
k
i j: the kth shortest path
from MDi to MD j in graph G. There can be multiple equal
length shortest paths between any pair of MDs in graph G.
For example, in Fig. 1 two shortest paths, MD8 → MD2 →
MD1 and MD8→MD6→MD1 exist between MD8 and MD1.
Then, we have P118 =MD8→MD2→MD1 and P
2
18 =MD8→
MD6→MD1. Ki j: set of indices of the shortest paths between
MDi and MD j. For example, in Fig. 1 because two shortest
paths exist between MD8 and MD1, we have K81 = {1,2}.
Li j: number of MDs in the shortest paths between MDi and
MD j. In the example in Fig. 1, we have L18 = 3. With Eq. 1,
Nthreshold : maximum number of MDs allowed in one tree.
We associate a binary variable xki j with every shortest path
Pki j between MDi (∀i∈M) and MD j (∀ j ∈R). For all MDi’s
out of the candidate set and MD j’s in the candidate set, that
is ∀i ∈M\R and ∀ j ∈R, we have
xki j =
{
1 if MDi’s data is collected along P
k
i j to MD j
0 if MDi’s data is not collected along P
k
i j to MD j
Furthermore, for all MDi belonging to the candidate set,
that is ∀i ∈ R, we have x1ii = 1 if MDi is selected as a root;
otherwise, x1ii = 0.
In the objective function (2), maxi∈M ∑k∈Ki j x
k
i jLi j for some
fixed j ∈R represents the depth of the tree rooted at candidate
root MD j. Furthermore, maxi∈M ∑k∈Ki j x
k
i jLi j = 0 if MD j is
not chosen as the root of any collection tree. Therefore, by
summing over ∀ j ∈ R, we have the objective function (2)
representing the total depth over all constructed trees.
The inequality constraints (5) ensure that any MDi can send
data to MD j over path P
k
i j only if one of MDi’s neighbors
MDm chooses to send data to MD j over P
l
m j, a sub-path of path
Pki j. Refer to Fig. 1, suppose P
1
51 = MD5→MD4→MD1 and
P141 = MD4 →MD1 with P
1
41 ⊆ P
1
51, then we have x
1
51 ≤ x
1
41,
which means MD5 can choose to send data to MD1 over path
P151 only if MD4 chooses to send data to MD1 along path P
1
41.
In a word, the single path constraints (4) and the sub-
path constraints (5) together ensure that we construct multiple
disjoint trees rooted at all or a subset of the MDs in the
candidate set. Furthermore, the security constraints (3) further
ensure that the number of nodes in every constructed tree is
no larger than the threshold.
C. Solution and Analysis
To solve CTF, we firstly transform it into the standard
format by rewriting (2) as follows:
min ∑
j∈R
z j (7)
s.t. z j ≥ ∑
k∈Ki j
xki jLi j,∀i ∈M, j ∈R (8)
(7) and (8), together with constraints (3) to (6), form the
modified CTF. The modified-CTF problem is equivalent to
the original CTF problem in terms of the optimal objective
function value. Nevertheless, the mixed-integer programming
problem is an NP-hard problem. Thus, we propose to use an
approximation algorithm by means of a linear relaxation based
iterative rounding (LR-IR) [21] as shown in Algorithm 1. It is
Algorithm 1: LR-IR for Modified-CTF
Input: G, Nthershold , R
Output: Modified-CTF {xki j}
while true do1
solve the LP relaxation of the modified-CTF with2
xki j ∈ [0,1] and get optimal solution {x
k∗
i j };
round the largest fractional solution within {xk∗i j } to 1;3
if xk∗i j ∈ {0,1} (∀i ∈M, j ∈R,k ∈ Ki j) then4
return {xk∗i j };5
end6
end7
obvious that the worst-case number of iterations of Algorithm
1 is O(N) with respect to the number of decision variables xki j.
Also, Algorithm 1 terminates when each xki j equals to 0 or 1.
V. SIMULATION
In our simulation, we use the SG data set for Washington,
DC [22]. The data set contains the exact positions of all the
utility poles in the city. We extract the positions of 300 utility
poles from two portions of the DC map, as illustrated in Fig.
5 and Fig. 6.
Specifically, there are 8 stars in both figures representing
MDs in the candidate root set. In Fig. 5, we assume that the
DC is traveling along the southernmost street. In Fig. 6, the
DC is assumed to be traveling along the westernmost street.
 ✁✂✄☎
Fig. 5. MD Topology I.
✆✝✞✟✠
Fig. 6. MD Topology II.
Then, we pick evenly distributed 8 MDs along the two streets
to be the candidate root sets. Furthermore, we assume that
MDs communicate with each other wirelessly with an identical
communication range of 100m. Also, topology II has a large
MD density(826/km2) than than topology I (722/km2). We
used GUROBI solver [23] for our simulations.
In our simulation, we construct a scenario by choosing |M|
MDs nearest to the reference streets. For example, in topology
I, 50 MDs that are nearest to the southernmost street in Fig. 5
are selected to construct the scenario.
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(b) MD Topology II
Fig. 7. Comparison of Total Tree Depth.
In Fig. 7, we compare the total depth of the constructed
trees in scenarios with different number of MDs generated by
three algorithms: The optimal algorithm is the solution from
GUROBI or the modified-CTF problem. The approximation
algorithm refers to Algorithm 1. In the random tree formation
algorithm, every MD randomly selects a neighbor which has
been included in a tree to be its parent. Also, in Fig. 7, two
cases are considered in both topologies, namely Nthreshold =
40%× |M| and Nthreshold = 80%× |M|. For example, if we
assume that every MD leaks the group key with probabil-
ity p = 0.01 and |M| = 100, then Nthreshold = 40%× |M|
means we set the threshold probability Pthreshold = 1− (1−
p)40%×|M| = 1− (1−0.01)40%×100 = 0.331.
In Fig. 7, our approximation algorithm yields a total tree
depth which is much smaller than that of the random tree
formation algorithm while staying fairly close to the optimal
value. Also, as the maximum tree size (Nthreshold) increases,
both the optimal and the approximation algorithms tend to
yield decreasing values of the total tree depth. This observation
actually captures the inherent trade-off between efficiency
and security of our optimization formulation. We will further
demonstrate it in Fig. 9.
The comparison of the completion time (in terms of sec-
onds) of the optimal algorithm and the approximation algo-
rithm with different numbers of MDs is provided in Table I.
|M| 25 50 75 100
Top. I Optimal 1.953 73.956 1418.134 6422.439
Top. I Approx. (40%) 0.048 1.892 12.309 15.319
Top. II Optimal 2.332 1650.730 6503.994 36009.112
Top. II Approx. (40%) 0.089 1.807 4.235 5.254
TABLE I
ALGORITHM COMPLETION TIME IN SECONDS.
We can readily observe that completion time of the optimal
algorithm increases exponentially with the number of MDs.
In contrast, our approximation algorithm has much lower
completion time.
Furthermore, from Table I, we observe that when |M| =
100, the optimal algorithm already has to take more than 6000s
to complete. This indicates that when solving the modified-
CTF problem for a network of more than 100 MDs, it is
better to turn to our approximation algorithm. Hence, we carry
out simulation in scenarios with up to 300 MDs whereby our
approximation algorithm terminates in reasonable time period.
From Fig. 8, we can observe that the approximation algo-
rithm outperforms the baseline random tree formation algo-
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Fig. 8. Comparison of Total Tree Depth (Approximation vs. Random).
rithm in terms of the total tree depth when the number of
MDs is larger than 100.
In Fig. 9, we fix the number of MDs to be |M| = 50 and
vary the maximum percentage of MDs in one tree,
Nthreshold
|M|
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Fig. 9. Efficiency and Security Tradeoff
from 20% to 70%. As this ratio increases, we see an increasing
trend of the average constructed tree size and a decreasing
trend of the total tree depth. This observation reflects the
trade-off between efficiency and security of data collection
inherently in our problem formulation. More specifically, if
we allow MDs to form trees with larger sizes then the total
depth of constructed trees tends to be smaller.
VI. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we develop a secure and efficient protocol to
collect data from measurement devices (MD) in a multi-hop
manner through a mobile data collector (DC). MDs report data
via trees rooted at the MDs that have direct communication
with the DC. We formulate the secure and optimal tree
construction problem as an integer linear programming, and
develop an approximation algorithm to compute a solution.
The simulations conducted using real topologies reflect that
our algorithm performs well and efficiently.
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